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This paper aims to quantify the impact of social benefits on labor market 
participation in the Czech Republic. It applies the logistic regression to estimate the 
probability of labor market participation depending on social benefits related to net 
wage of the individuals, controlling for individual  and household characteristics 
(age, presence of spouse and children etc.). The work disincentives via social 
benefits do exist and proved to be relatively strong. When trying to understand the 
reasons for recently decreasing participation rate in the Czech Republic, the often 
called “generous” Czech social benefit system appears to be relevant. 
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The total participation rate was gradually increasing in the EU-25 from 68.7% in 2000 to 
70.5% in 2006 as well as the male (from 77.4% to 78.0%) and female (from 60.0% to 63.1%) 
participation rates (European Commission, 2007). This trend appears not to be followed by 
the Czech Republic where the total participation rate  was  continuously decreasing  from 
71.3% to 70.3% in the same period with male rate falling from 79.1% to 78.3% and female 
rate from 63.6% to 62.3%. 
Social benefits can create substantial disincentives to labor market participation. If we try to 
achieve higher participation rate, such disincentives should be eliminated in order to “ make 
work pay”. The Czech Republic experienced reforms in social security system recently with 
its first phase already starting from 2008.  The main goal is to  spur the labor market 
participation by lowering the income redistribution.
1 In this context, this paper is concerned 
with the impact of social benefits on decision about labor market participation in the Czech 
Republic. 
                                                 
1  The total amount of redistributed income should be lowered by more than 8 billions CZK during 2008 
(Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs).   2 
Using the most recent data from the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions database it 
aims to find out whether the social benefit level influences the participation on the labor 
market. More precisely, it estimates the probability of labor market participation  of the 
individuals depending on the social benefits they would receive in case they did not work in 
the previous year related to their net wage. Consequently, it tries to reveal whether the social 
security reforms can affect the participation decision in the Czech Republic.  
This paper offers  an econometric analysis of labor market participation— using the 
microeconomic data— which controls for social benefits related to wage, family structure and 
other variables. Its aim is to reveal how the probability of labor market participation differs 
depending on the relative social benefits in the Czech labor market, running the regression 
model for all individuals as well as for women separately. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a literature overview and 
outlines the importance of the selected topic.  Section 3 depicts the methodology for the 
participation equation estimations. It also describes the EU-SILC data to which the present 
paper is to be applied and variables used in the model. Section 4 presents the results, also 
separately for women. The main results are summarized in Section 5, including the discussion 
of possible effect of social security reforms on the labor market participation. 
2 Literature overview and motivation 
It is often argued that the tax-benefit systems have caused the labor market problems both on 
demand and supply side ( see,  e.g., Immervoll, O ’ Donoghue, 2003; OECD, 1997). In 
particular, generous out-of-work income can create significant disincentives to search well-
paid work or to stay in work. These disincentives were often assumed to be one of the main 
causes of slow economic growth and unemployment (European Commission, 2000).   3 
Generally, the social protection policies have been traditionally focused particularly on old 
age, short-term unemployment and disability. Several crucial factors influenced the social 
protection regimes in the past decade. First, increasing long-term unemployment led to longer 
unemployment benefits claims and greater dependence on social assistance as the 
unemployment benefits are often time-limited.
2 Second, the family structure changed over 
time; there are more single-parent families, more households of individuals living alone etc., 
which are threatened by poverty more likely and are, therefore, more dependent on social 
assistance.
3 
The study of the European Commission (2004) points out that the so-called  working age 
benefit dependency ratio recorded significant changes in EU member states during the 1990s.
4 
The benefit dependency ratio expresses the number of persons receiving a social security 
benefit in relation to the number of persons in employment.
5 Considering only the 
unemployment benefits and social assistance the ratio rose until 1993 and declined thereafter 
in majority of covered countries. Generally, the benefit dependency is higher among women 
than among men although the difference has decreased over the 1990s. 
The social benefit system (together with the tax system
 ) involves the trade-off between the 
equity and efficiency targets. Work dis/incentives can be captured by various measures. The 
out-of-work income relative to in-work income, measured by the replacement rates as a proxy 
for benefit generosity (e.g., OECD, 2002), affects the decision to participate on the labor 
                                                 
2 For example, the long-term unemployment as a percentage of labor force rose from 2.0 in 1998 to 4.2 in 2005 
in the Czech Republic (European Commission, 2006). 
3 4.3% of all households were single-parent households with dependent children and 22.8% were households of 
individuals in the Czech Republic in 2005 (Czech Statistical Office, 2007a). The at-risk-of-poverty rate (share of 
persons under poverty threshold, which is 60% of median of national equivalised disposable income) for persons 
living in single-parent households was 41.0% and 16.4% for one-person households in 2005 in the Czech 
Republic, while this index was 10.4% on average (Czech Statistical Office, 2007a). 
4 This study included  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Netherland, Spain and 
Sweden. 
5 The benefit years of persons aged 15 to 65 to the total number of labour years (all persons aged 15 or older, in 
full-time equivalents).   4 
market. If the replacement rate is too high that work “does not pay”, it can result in so-called 
unemployment trap (see, e.g., Carone and Salomä ki, 2001; Snower, 1997).  
OECD (2002) study compares the net replacements rates (NRR) across member countries.
6 It 
provides the net replacement rates for several types of households of various unemployment 
duration, considering the available level of social benefits and the average production worker 
salary. NRR for persons in the initial period of unemployment with not working spouse and 
two children was 70% in the Czech Republic whilst the values ranged from 44% in Greece to 
91% in Canada and Switzerland. This figure was 80% for long-term unemployed who do not 
receive any unemployment benefits in the Czech Republic with the values ranging from 10% 
in Greece to 87% in Iceland.  
This suggests that long-term unemployed average production workers were less motivated to 
start to work than people in the initial phase of unemployment in the Czech Republic. The 
social benefits recipients can lose their motivation to search the job and to move from 
unemployment into employment. Moreover, they can be encouraged to rely fully on the social 
system and/or withdraw entirely from the labor market. This effect can influence especially 
the low-wage workers. Not entering the labor market can be in their interest since the earned 
income could differ only moderately from their out-of-work income. Theoretically, the higher 
the provided allowances, the lower are incentives to enter the labor market. 
Another indicator which can be used to measure the extent to which benefits and taxes 
decrease the motivation to start to work is the marginal effective tax rate (METR). This 
measure describes the share of additional income which is taxed away when moving to 
employment.
7  Carone et al.  (2004) argue that the METR for an  unemployed average 
                                                 
6 Net replacement rate is calculated as a share of household out-of-work income and net in-work income, where 
the out-of-work income consists of housing benefits, family and children benefits added to unemployment 
insurance for short-term unemployed and to social assistance for long-term unemployed. 
7 METR = 1 – Δ ynet/Δ ygross, where the change in income corresponds to the additional income from moving to 
employment. This measure can be used to capture the unemployment trap (the additional income stems from   5 
production worker with not employed spouse returning to the same wage-level job was 77% 
in 2001 in the Czech Republic (ranging from 61% in Hungary to 96% in Slovakia).  
Beside the unemployment trap, we can distinguish so-called inactivity trap which applies to 
people not receiving any unemployment benefits, who are out of the labor force or “inactive” 
in sense of paid employment.  Inactive individuals who would like to (re)enter the labor 
market face up work disincentives resulting from tax benefit systems so that they often decide 
to stay out of the labor force. Minimum income and various benefits, which would be lost 
when taking up a paid job, can be one of the reasons for non-participation. 
The inactivity trap can be measured by METR for inactive people. According to Carone et al. 
(2004) study the METR for an inactive person with not employed spouse and two children 
starting to work w ith average production salary  amounted to  77% in 2001 in the Czech 
Republic (ranging from 12% in Italy to 96% in Slovakia). Therefore, this suggests that the 
social benefits for an inactive couple with two children  were relatively high, such that a 
movement to employment leaved the family only with 23% of the additional income. The 
METR  was significantly lower for example for similar family without children (64%). 
Therefore, the  benefits related to children might play  a significant role. The  decision to 
participate on the labor market could be also highly influenced by the family structure and 
economic status of the spouse. 
Based on the tax-benefit system in the Czech Republic in 2002, the OECD (2004) study 
argues that the work disincentives were created mainly to families with children, single parent 
families and also childless unemployed couples while s ingle persons and  persons  with 
employed spouse did not face such significant disincentives to take up a job.
8 
                                                                                                                                                       
moving from unemployment to employment), inactivity trap (the additional income comes from moving from 
inactivity to employment) and poverty trap (the additional income is related to increasing the number of hours 
worked for those already in low-paid work). 
8 Another point is that the state social support is not conditioned by active looking for a job so that  many 
beneficiaries stay on benefits for long periods, often ensuring income by working in the grey economy. Renoy at   6 
The inactivity trap affects particularly women, whose labor supply is more elastic than men’s, 
as shown, for example, by the study of Jaumotte (2003). It argues that, based on the data from 
2001, the share of inactive women who would like to have work is 12% on average in 19 
European countries, with a higher share among women in prime-working age, middle and 
higher education levels and, especially, among women who do not seek a job due to family 
commitments.  
Jaumotte (2003) applied an econometric analysis using macroeconomic data to determine the 
impact of relevant policies on female participation rates in several countries: social security 
system and child care subsidies were especially relevant. 
The above discussed studies consider “average” representative worker or family or are based 
on macroeconomic level, as well as most of the studies concerning the impacts of social 
benefit system on the labor market. As opposed to such studies, the present paper aims to 
examine the impact of social benefits on microeconomic level. We relate the (net) social 
benefits received in case of inactivity to net wages of the individuals and estimate their impact 
on labor market participation controlling for family circumstances, for both sexes and 
separately for women. The higher the benefits-wage ratio the lower we would expect the 
probability of labor market participation. In other words, the higher the benefits-wage ratio 
the more likely the individuals will be inactive. 
3 Methodology and data 
The purpose of this study is to assess the relationship between the social benefits and wages 
and its impact on participation decision. Section 3.1 depicts the approach and methodology 
applied in this paper. The next section describes the data and section 3.3 explains the variables 
                                                                                                                                                       
al. (2004) argue that housewives and registered unemployed create one of the main groups of undeclared 
workers.   7 
used to estimate the impact on participation decision and formulates the equation used in the 
logistic regression for participation.  
3.1 Methodology 
When individuals decide about their labor market participation, they consider whether the 
work does pay. We assume that the individuals compare the (net) social benefits they could 
receive to their possible net wage. Therefore, the social benefits relative to wage are supposed 
to influence the labor market participation decision rather than the social benefits and wage 
absolute levels.  
Majority of the social benefits are derived from the individual or household income of the 
previous year, hence, the individual only one year later finds out whether the work does pay. 
Since the data used in this paper covers only one-year income data, supplemented by the 
economic activity during the corresponding period, it is impossible to follow the economic 
activity during the previous year. Besides, it includes the current economic activity status 
which is several months lagged to the income reference period. 
We accept an assumption that the individuals compare their current social benefit level did 
they not work in the previous year (which mostly depends on last year’s income of the whole 
household and therefore on the economic activity of all household members) to their usual net 
wage. Therefore, we imputed all available social benefits to households of all individuals 
simulating the inactivity of the particular individual while all other family circumstances 
being the same, i.e. the economic activity and incomes of all other household members 
remaining the same. In other words, we subtracted the earned income of the particular 
individual from the household income decisive for various social benefits and imputed the 
social  benefits  received  in such a circumstance. Apparently, the social  benefits should   8 
correspond to real available allowances for those who were inactive during the whole 
previous year since their household income does not change. 
The assumption of all other family circumstances being the same while simulating t he 
inactivity of one household member is rather strong since there can be  various cross-
substitution  effects. For example, in a household of working individual and not working 
partner the cross-substitution effect of the individual’s shift into inactivity can move her/his 
partner to start working. Since the household utility function is unknown, we neglect the 
influence of possible cross-substitution effect. Moreover, nor the own-substitution effect can 
be observed. Individuals who prefer more leisure or non-paid work (e.g. family and child 
care) to consumption will tend to be more influenced by the level of available social benefits. 
Therefore, we expect that the impact of relative social benefits on labor market participation 
will be stronger for women since women are those who often care about the family.  
The  imputed  social benefits include child benefit, social allowance for families, parental 
allowance, social assistance benefit and housing allowance (the amounts were derived 
according to legal framework valid in relevant year, see European Commission, 2005). Since 
the social benefits are usually assigned at a household level we equivalised  the  imputed 
amount to the number of household members. 
For those who were employed during the income  reference year, we apply their average 
monthly net wage, and for inactive people, their potential net wage was estimated using the 
Heckman regression model ( Heckman,  1979; for another example of applied Heckman’s 
model, see, e.g., Beblo et al., 2003) in order to avoid the possible bias of estimated wages. 
This model was suggested in order to eliminate the selection bias which could occur when 
working individuals do not create a random sub-sample of the population but differ   9 
systematically from non-participating individuals.
9 The results of Heckman procedure are 
reported in Appendix. 
In our framework, the participation decision is then influenced by relative social benefits, 
measured as a share of the social benefits to usual net wage. If the ratio was sufficiently high, 
the work could not pay and the individuals could decide not to participate on the labor market. 
Finally, the ratio of (net) social benefits and net wage is included into the regressors of the 
participation model, controlling also for other variables influencing the labor market 
participation (household composition, presence of the spouse and her/his economic activity 
etc.).  
3.2 Data description 
The household survey EU-SILC
10 is a new panel survey which replaced the ECHP
11 in 2004. 
It is a harmonized survey compulsory for all EU member states, and thus providing reliable 
data for a possible cross-country comparison. EU-SILC is a so called four-year rotational 
panel, which means that information is being collected for four years about a number of 
households, out of which one quarter is dropped and a correspondent number randomly added 
each year. The data will consist of cross-sectional as well as longitudinal components in the 
following years. 
This study is based on EU-SILC 2005 data. The information is collected on a household level 
(mainly information on living conditions) and also on an individual level (e.g. individual and 
job characteristics, wages, income, social allowances). Reference period for income variables 
is the year 2004; the majority of other variables is related to the current situation, which 
means the time of the survey (the second quarter 2005 in case of the Czech Republic). 
                                                 
9 For more detailed discussion of appropriateness of the Heckman model, see, e.g., Mysíková (2007). 
10 European Union – Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. 
11 European Community Household Panel.   10 
The Czech data includes 10,333 individuals (8,628 aged 16 and over) in 4,351 households. In 
this study, individuals aged 16 to 64 years old are considered only. In order to avoid the 
ambiguity of participation decision, individuals in retirement, students, disabled and people in 
compulsory military community are excluded as their choice of economic activity is limited. 
Further, self-employed are eliminated since their income contains irregularities which would 
make the analysis biased. Part-time employees are excluded since their monthly income is 
incomparable with full-time workers’ wage.
12 Finally, unemployed were also excluded since 
the information on their unemployment status is self-reported and hence rather ambiguous.
13  
In other words, individuals who moved between full-time employment and inactivity during 
the survey reference period are included. This leaves us with 3,322 individuals, 3,107 of them 
do participate on the labor market and 215 do not. The female sub-sample consists of 1,579 
individuals. The data provides us with yearly net wages, therefore, the net monthly earned 
income was constructed according to the number of worked months. Individual weights which 
reflect the number of people in the whole population who are represented by a particular 
individual were included. 
3.3 The model and variables description 
The logistic regression is used for computations since the endogenous variable in the applied 
model is dichotomous. This variable is the participation on the labor market, which takes the 
value of 1 if the individual participates and 0 if she/he is out of the labor force in the current 
reference period (second quarter 2005). 
                                                 
12 The exclusion of part-time workers represents a negligible number of workers since part-time employment is 
very low in the Czech Republic.  Moreover, we excluded those who have never worked  since their job 
characteristics are missing and those whose monthly wage was highly undervalued due to sickness; these cases 
covered sufficiently small number of individuals that the exclusion cannot influence the results. 
13 From participation decision point of view, the unemployed people are participating in the labor market. But is 
hard to distinguish whether a self-reported unemployment status means that the individual is not able to find a 
job or whether she/he lacks the effort to find a job and therefore her/his economic status is rather “inactive”. 
Moreover, the unemployment benefits are rather of different nature than the social benefits— the first serve as a 
time-limited compensation for lost wage while the second should compensate lasting weak social conditions.   11 
The logistic model takes the following form: 
ln [p/(1-p)] = β 0 + β iXi                                                                                                            (1) 
where p is the probability of participation on the labor market and vector  i X  includes all 
explanatory variables. The explanatory variables included in equation (1) were the benefits-
wage ratio, age, education, sex, presence of working and not working partner, presence of 
children and region as a proxy for unemployment rate. 
The benefits-wage ratio (BEN_WAGE) is the share of the imputed equivalised monthly social 
benefits to the “ usual” net monthly wage.
14 AGEk are the dummies for age reflecting also the 
work experience. The education (EDUC_TER) is represented by a dummy variable for tertiary 
education.
15 SEX is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the individual is male. EM_PART 
and NEM_PART are dummies for the presence of employed partner and not employed partner 
in the household, respectively. The counterpart to these two variables is living without any 
partner. CHILD0_2, CHILD3_5 and CHILD6_15 are dummies for the presence of children 
aged 0 to 2, 3 to 5 and 6 to 15 years, respectively.  
REGl are dummies for region as a proxy for unemployment rates. The unemployment rates in 
regions on NUTS2 level were clustered into four groups. The unemployment rate in region is 
supposed to have some effect on labor market participation via “discouraged worker effect” 
although the evidence of this effect is rather ambiguous (see, e.g., Sandmeyer and Warner, 
1970; Schweitzer and Smith, 1974). 
                                                 
14 The benefits-wage ratio is similar to the net replacement rate (in this study, the net in-work income includes 
earned income only). The marginal effective tax rate (METR) could be also included among the regressors. 
METR serves as another indicator of work dis/incentives bearing similar information. However, its addition into 
the model would require microsimulations including conversions between net and gross earnings which would 
be very rough and, therefore, we omit this variable.  
15 The number of individuals with primary education was too low, therefore, this group was merged with the 
group of individuals with secondary educational level.   12 
4 Results 
The results for both sexes (model (1)) and female model (2) are reported in Table 1. The best 
fitted models were selected.  Both the models appeared to be robust— Gini coefficient 
(cumulative accuracy ratio) amounts to 83.9 for total model (1) and 83.4 for female model (2), 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to 75.2 for total model (1) and 77.1 for female model (2). Another 
widely used measure of the overall fit of the model is to examine its ability to correctly 
classify observations. This figure shows 97.0% correctness for the total model and 94.8% for 
female model.
16 
The benefits-wage ratio proved to be significant and negative in model (1) and affirms the 
expectations that the h igh values of social benefits do negatively affect labor market 
participation. If the benefits-wage ratio rises by 1, the chance of participation will change 0.60 
times.
17 For example, if the benefits are zero and the share of participating individuals to not 
participating individuals is 1, i.e. the  probability of participation is 50%, then the rise of 
benefits to the wage level will lower the share of the participating individuals  to not 
participating individuals  to 0.6, i.e. the  probability of  participation decreases to 37%. 
                                                 
16 The cut value is 0.5. 
17 For details about the interpretation of continuous variables in a logistic regression, see Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(2000). Table 1 Participation model 
Total model (1)  Female model (2) 
 
coeff.  s.e.  odds  coeff.  s.e.  odds 
B_W  -0.513**  (0.257)  0.599  -0.603*  (0.343)  0.547 
AGE_30  0.923***  (0.508)  2.518  -  -  - 
AGE31_45  1.204**  (0.517)  3.333  -  -  - 
AGE46_55  0.692  (0.506)  1.998  -  -  - 
EDUC_TER  -  -  -  1.052**  (0.419)  2.863 
SEX  3.756***  (0.395)  42.766  -  -  - 
EM_PART  -  -  -  -0.495  (0.340)  0.610 
NEM_PART  0.797**  (0.390)  2.219  -0.844*  (0.487)  0.430 
CHILD0_2  -4.166***  (0.258)  0.016  -5.041***  (0.307)  0.006 
CHILD3_5  -2.055***  (0.256)  0.128  -2.256***  (0.289)  0.105 
CHILD6_15  -0.731***  (0.245)  0.482  -0.539**  (0.273)  0.583 
CONSTANT  2.725***  (0.444)  15.254  4.282***  (0.360)  72.399 
Notes: * significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level, *** significance at the 1% level. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
Model (1): Correctness of observation classification 97.0%, cumulative accuracy ratio 83.9, K-S test 75.2. 
Model (2): Correctness of observation classification 94.8%, cumulative accuracy ratio 83.4, K-S test 77.1. 
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC data. 
 
The other, controlling, variables do not show surprising results— the highest probability of 
participation occurs when the individuals are aged between 31 and 45; men are more likely to 
participate on the labor market;  the presence of  non-employed  partner in the household 
increases the probability  of participation  (compared to individuals living  with employed 
spouse or  without  any  spouse); the presence of children lowers the probability of 
participation— the younger the children the lower the probability. The dummies for regions 
were highly insignificant in both models. 
Similarly, the female model (2) proved the benefits-wage ratio to be significant and the effect 
is even stronger—  if the benefits-wage ratio rises by 1, the chance of participation will change 
0.55 times. The same illustrative example as for the total model (1) shows that if the benefits 
are zero and the share of participating individuals to not participating individuals is 1, i.e. the 
probability of participation is 50%, then the rise of benefits to the wage level will lower the 
share of the participating individuals to not participating individuals to 0.55, i.e. the 
probability of participation decreases to 35%. This also affirms our assumption that women   14 
tend to prefer unpaid work, i.e. mostly the family and child care, or leisure to paid work more 
than men. 
As opposed to the model (1), the dummies for age proved highly insignificant, while the 
tertiary education significantly increases the  probability of female participation. The 
probability of participation  of women living with employed partner  is low (although 
insignificant) and even lower when they live with not employed partner (compared to women 
living without any partner). This suggests that women’s decision about labor market 
participation is not sensitive to the economic activity of the partner. The coefficients of the 
variables referring to the presence of children  show that female participation is more 
negatively influenced than the male participation (or, more precisely, in comparison with the 
total model). This confirms an intuitive supposition that women with children stay at home 
and only (re)enter the labor market when their children reach higher age. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of social benefits on the labor market participation in the 
Czech Republic. Since the share of social income  to total gross income  has been rather 
increasing recently in the Czech Republic, the social benefits level could be a relevant factor 
when considering the decreasing labor market participation in the Czech Republic over the 
last years. 
The share of social income amounted to 9.8% of the total gross income in households where 
the head of the household was an employee in 2004, with a slight decrease to 9.4% in 2005. 
On the other side, this share rose from 54.3% to 55.4% in households of unemployed and 
from  36.0%  to 40.2% in households  of (not retired) inactive  persons as a head of the 
household between these two years (Czech Statistical Office, 2007a-b). Therefore, social 
benefits can create substantial incentives to withdraw from/enter the labor market.   15 
The social benefits received in case of individual’s inactivity relative to her/his net wage 
proved to be relevant for the probability of participation. If the benefits-wage ratio rises from 
0 to 1, the chance of participation will change 0.60 times. The higher the relative social 
benefits, the more likely individuals decide not to participate on the labor market. 
This effect is even more apparent separately for women where the increase of benefits from 
zero to the wage level changes the chance of female labor market participation 0.55 times, 
which confirms our initial supposition. Moreover, the presence of children in the household 
has a higher negative effect of on participation in case of women. Women’s probability of 
participation is lower when they live either with not employed or employed partner, signaling 
that women’s participation decision is insensitive to the economic activity of the partner. 
Therefore, women are even more likely to prefer unpaid work (family and child care) or 
leisure than men. Consequently, women’s decision about leaving/entering the labor market is 
more sensitive to changes of relative social benefits. 
We can conclude that the often called “generous” social benefit system in the Czech Republic 
do create certain work disincentives. The  proceeding reforms, if effective, could be an 
appropriate way how to remedy the decreasing labor market participation rate.   16 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 The results of Heckman model applied for wage imputations 
  coeff.  s.e.    coeff.  s.e. 
LN_WAGE  PARTICIPATION 
EDUC_Y  0.040***  (0.004)  UNEARN_INC  -0.013***  (0.003) 
YEARS_W  0.017***  (0.002)  AGE_30  0.496**  (0.251) 
YEARS_W2  0.000***  (0.000)  AGE31_45  0.700***  (0.251) 
SEX  0.221***  (0.014)  AGE46_55  0.440  (0.294) 
REG1  0.123***  (0.025)  CHILD0_2  -1.583***  (0.153) 
REG2  0.020  (0.023)  CHILD3_5  -0.871***  (0.134) 
REG3  -0.027  (0.023)  EMP_PART  -0.365***  (0.122) 
REG4  -0.038  (0.025)  EDUC_TER  0.292*  (0.160) 
REG5  -0.076***  (0.023)  SEX  1.504***  (0.243) 
REG6  -0.080***  (0.022)  CONSTANT  1.579***  (0.273) 
REG7  -0.102***  (0.023)  RHO  0.445  (0.163) 
ISCO1  0.562***  (0.040)  SIGMA  0.296  (0.005) 
ISCO2  0.430***  (0.030)  LAMBDA  0.132  (0.049) 
ISCO3  0.418***  (0.025)       
ISCO4  0.335***  (0.028)       
ISCO5  0.086***  (0.028)       
ISCO6  0.027  (0.048)       
ISCO7  0.200***  (0.026)       
ISCO8  0.150***  (0.028)  Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): 
ISCO0  0.682***  (0.064)  chi2(1) = 5.57     
CONSTANT  3.195***  (0.062)  Prob > chi2 = 0.0183 
Notes: * significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level, *** significance at the 1% level. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC data. 
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